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WHEN MAY A PRESIDENT REFUSE TO DEFEND A 
STATUTE?  THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION 
AND DOMA 
Carlos A. Ball* 
Presidents sometimes make the controversial decision not to defend a 
federal statute they believe is unconstitutional.1  It may be tempting, when 
assessing the appropriateness of these decisions, to adopt one of two 
categorical positions: either that the President should never refuse to defend 
a law based on his view that it is unconstitutional, or that the President has 
unlimited constitutional authority to refuse to defend laws on that basis.2 
I do not believe that either of these categorical approaches is 
warranted.3  The former view insufficiently accounts for the fact that the 
 
*
  Professor of Law and Judge Frederick Lacey Scholar, Rutgers University School of Law 
(Newark).  On April 15, 2011, I testified before a subcommittee of the U.S. House of Representatives on 
the appropriateness of President Obama‘s decision not to defend the constitutionality of the Defense of 
Marriage Act.  See Hearing on “Defending Marriage,” Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the 
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011) (testimony of Carlos A. Ball), available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Ball04152011.pdf (link). 
1
  Every recent administration has refused to defend some laws that it believed were 
unconstitutional.  President Ronald Reagan, for instance, successfully challenged (rather than merely 
refused to defend) a statute that allowed either House of Congress to invalidate an administrative 
decision made by the Executive Branch.  Seth P. Waxman, Defending Congress, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1073, 
1084 (2001) (link).  President George H. W. Bush refused to defend the constitutionality of provisions in 
the Cable Television Act of 1992 that required cable companies to carry certain content.  Id. at 1084.  
The Department of Justice under President Bill Clinton refused to defend the constitutionality of a law 
that sought to limit rights under the Supreme Court‘s decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 
(1966) (link).  Waxman, supra, at 1087–88.  In 2004, the Department of Justice under President George 
W. Bush refused to defend a federal law prohibiting the placement of marijuana reform ads on public 
transportation systems.  Letter from Paul Clement, Solicitor Gen., U.S. Dep‘t of Justice, to Patricia 
Mack Bryant, Senate Legal Counsel, U.S. Senate (Dec. 23, 2004) (link); see also Letter from Andrew 
Fois, Assistant Att‘y Gen., U.S. Dep‘t of Justice, to Senator Orrin G. Hatch, Chairman, Comm. on the 
Judiciary 8 (March 22, 1996) (compiling a list showing forty-five instances between 1975 and 1993 in 
which the Department of Justice communicated to Congress that it was declining to defend or enforce a 
statute) (link). 
2
  See Dawn E. Johnsen, Presidential Non-Enforcement of Constitutionally Objectionable Statutes, 
63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 9–10 (2000) (discussing ―two prevailing approaches to presidential non-
enforcement found in the academic literature[,]‖ one which holds that the President must always enforce 
statutes ―regardless of [his] constitutional views[,]‖ and ―[t]he competing view [that] recognizes 
presidential authority to refuse to enforce any and all laws the President believes are unconstitutional‖) 
(link). 
3
  See id. at 10 (―[T]he Constitution is best interpreted not as providing a unitary answer across 
contexts, but as requiring the President to make sometimes difficult evaluations that depend on the 
specific statutory provision and the circumstances surrounding its enactment.‖). 
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Executive Branch, as a co-equal branch of government, has an independent 
duty to ―interpret and implement the Constitution.‖4  As Professor Dawn 
Johnsen has explained, ―Congress and the President . . . are obligated to 
uphold, and thus by necessity to interpret, the Constitution, and the process 
of constitutional interpretation benefits from the thoughtful participation of 
the elected representatives of the people in the public dialogue about the 
meaning of the Constitution.‖5 
At the same time, an expansive understanding of executive power in 
this area insufficiently accounts for the authority of the other two branches 
to also make independent constitutional judgments.  As Seth Waxman has 
noted, ―[v]igorously defending congressional legislation serves the 
institutional interests and constitutional judgments of all three branches.  It 
ensures that proper respect is given to Congress‘s policy choices.  It 
preserves for the courts their historic function of judicial review.‖6 
In determining whether to defend a statute, the President and his 
advisers should reject categorical positions about his constitutional 
authority in this area and instead pursue a context-driven approach that 
looks at several different factors.  In this Essay, I identify four factors that 
should be taken into account.7  Although I do not mean for these factors to 
 
4
  H. Jefferson Powell, Reasoning About the Irrational: The Roberts Court and the Future of 
Constitutional Law, 86 WASH. L. REV. 217, 241 (2011) (link).  Professor Powell explains that ―[f]rom 
the beginning, the almost universal acceptance by Americans of judicial review has gone hand-in-hand 
with a widespread understanding that other governmental officials have a duty to govern themselves by 
the Constitution and not merely to avoid constitutional entanglements with the courts.‖  Id. at 242.  As 
Professor Cornelia Pillard has noted, ―the Constitution‘s grant of executive power, together with the 
duty faithfully to execute the laws, means that the Executive and Congress acting in their own spheres 
must interpret and apply the Constitution.‖ Cornelia T.L. Pillard, The Unfulfilled Promise of the 
Constitution in Executive Hands, 103 MICH. L. REV. 676, 687 (2005) (footnote omitted) (link). 
The President‘s authority to reach independent assessments about the constitutionality of statutes ―is 
reflected in the Take Care Clause and in the President‘s oath of office.‖  Memorandum from Walter 
Dellinger, Assistant Att‘y Gen., to Abner J. Mikva, Counsel to the President, Presidential Authority to 
Decline to Execute Unconstitutional Statutes (Nov. 2, 1994), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/olc/nonexcut.htm (link).  The President‘s authority to interpret and implement 
the Constitution has been recognized, at least implicitly, by the other two branches of government.  The 
Supreme Court in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (link), ―sustained the President‘s view that 
the statute at issue was unconstitutional without any member of the Court suggesting that the President 
had acted improperly in refusing to abide by the statute.‖  Presidential Authority to Decline to Execute 
Unconstitutional Statutes, supra.  For its part, Congress has enacted a statute requiring that the 
Executive Branch notify Congress whenever it decides to refrain from enforcing or defending any 
provision of federal law.  21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, Pub. L. 
107–273, § 202, 116 Stat. 1758, 1771 (2002) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 530D (2010)) (link). 
5
  Johnsen, supra note 2, at 11–12. 
6
  Waxman, supra note 1, at 1078. 
7
  My thinking on these issues has been influenced by Professor Johnsen‘s thoughtful article on 
presidential nonenforcement of statutes.  See Johnsen, supra note 2.  It bears emphasizing, however, that 
Professor Johnsen‘s article, like most of the literature in this area, addresses the President‘s authority to 
refuse to enforce (as opposed to the authority to refuse to defend) a federal statute.  See, e.g., David 
Barron, Constitutionalism in the Shadow of Doctrine: The President’s Non-Enforcement Power, 63 LAW 
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be exhaustive,8 I believe their application can go a long way in helping us 
assess the appropriateness of a President‘s decision not to defend a 
particular statute based on his constitutional views. 
The four factors, which I elaborate on in Part I, are whether (1) there 
are binding judicial precedents on the relevant constitutional issues; (2) 
those issues raise significant normative and policy questions; (3) Congress 
considered the constitutional issues during the enactment process; and (4) it 
is likely that the President‘s decision will preclude judicial review. 
President Obama‘s recent decision9 to no longer defend10 the 
constitutionality of § 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act of 1996 (DOMA)11 
has been criticized by some as unjustified and improper.12  I disagree with 
 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 61 (2000) (link); Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Executive’s Duty to Disregard 
Unconstitutional Laws, 96 GEO. L.J. 1613 (2008) (link).  An administration‘s decision not to defend a 
law while continuing to enforce it is a more limited exercise of Executive Branch authority than is a 
decision not to enforce the statute.  If a President has the constitutional authority to refuse to enforce a 
law, then it would seem that he also has the authority to take the more limited step of refusing to defend 
the statute while continuing to enforce it. 
8
  Some have reasonably claimed, for example, that the President has greater authority to decline to 
defend a statute when it encroaches on the constitutional authority of the Presidency.  See, e.g., 
Waxman, supra note 1, at 1084–85; Presidential Authority to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional 
Statutes, supra note 4. 
9
  Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att‘y Gen., U.S. Dep‘t of Justice, to the Honorable John A. 
Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives (Feb. 23, 2011) [hereinafter Letter to Speaker] (link).  
It bears noting that the Obama Administration continues to enforce DOMA despite its refusal to defend 
it in court.  Id. at 5.  For some of the differences between a refusal to enforce and one to defend, see 
supra note 7 and infra notes 32–33 and accompanying text. 
10
  Prior to President Obama‘s decision, his Department of Justice had been defending DOMA in the 
courts.  See, e.g., Gill v. Off. of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010) (link). 
11
  The section states as follows: 
 
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, 
or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United 
States, the word ‗marriage‘ means only a legal union between one man and one 
woman as husband and wife, and the word ‗spouse‘ refers only to a person of the 
opposite sex who is a husband or a wife. 
 
Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. 104–199, § 3, 110 Stat. 2419, 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 
(2010)) (link).  Another section of DOMA, not implicated by the Administration‘s decision, seeks to 
exempt states from any obligation to recognize same-sex marriages entered into in other jurisdictions.  
Id. § 2 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2010)) (link).  Unless otherwise noted, my references to DOMA 
in this Essay are limited to § 3 of that statute. 
12
  See, e.g., Hearing on “Defending Marriage” Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of Edward Whelan, President, Ethics and Public 
Policy Center) (link); Theodore H. Frank, Obama’s Dangerous Divorce from DOMA: The Executive 
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that criticism in this Essay.  After applying the four factors in Part II, I 
conclude that President Obama‘s decision was appropriate. 
Our constitutional system based on separation-of-powers principles 
works best when a President‘s exercise of his authority not to defend a 
statute is used sparingly.13  There should be a strong presumption that the 
Executive Branch will defend laws duly enacted by Congress.14  On rare 
occasions, however, it is appropriate for the Executive Branch to refuse to 
defend a law that the President believes is unconstitutional.  President 
Obama‘s decision not to defend DOMA is one of those instances. 
I. ASSESSING A PRESIDENT‘S DECISION NOT TO DEFEND A LAW 
In formulating a list of factors pertinent to evaluating a President‘s 
decision not to defend a particular statute, I have been guided by separation-
of-powers considerations and the constitutional authority of the other two 
branches of government.  In particular, the four factors discussed below are 
intended to be consistent with the principle that although all three branches 
have a role to play in interpreting and applying the Constitution, the 
Judiciary should be the final arbiter on the constitutionality of our laws. 
I do not mean for any of the factors discussed here to be dispositive.  
Instead, they should be considered together as part of a contextual and case-
specific assessment of a President‘s decision not to defend a particular law 
based on his constitutional views. 
A. Are There Binding Legal Precedents? 
If the courts have decided the constitutional question at issue, but 
Congress nonetheless enacts a statute in apparent disregard of those rulings, 
then the President may refuse to defend the statute.15  Similarly, if the courts 
have decided constitutional issues in ways that make it clear that they 
would uphold the constitutionality of a given statute, the President should 
not refuse to defend it on the ground that he disagrees with the courts‘ 
 
13
  See Johnsen, supra note 2, at 12 (―When . . . the subject of the President‘s constitutional 
interpretation is whether to enforce the clear dictates of a statute, the constitutional structure dictates not 
independence but restraint.‖). 
14
  See id. (―If Presidents were to disregard laws routinely based solely on their own constitutional 
views, they would deprive Congress of the ability to enact effective legislation premised on its 
considered constitutional views to the contrary . . . .‖). 
15
  See id. at 10 (―The President . . . promotes implementation of the Supreme Court‘s 
pronouncements by declining to enforce laws that are indistinguishable from those the Court has held 
unconstitutional . . . .‖). 
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constitutional views.16  It may be that those prior rulings should be 
reconsidered, but that is a decision for the Judiciary to make.17 
At the same time, the absence of binding precedents gives the 
President greater leeway in asserting his constitutional views.18  As already 
noted, the President, as the leader of a co-equal branch of government, has 
an independent duty to interpret and apply the Constitution.19  The absence 
of binding legal precedents is one factor that allows a President to meet that 
obligation without unduly interfering with the Judiciary‘s role in 
constitutional interpretation. 
B. What Is the Nature of the Constitutional Issues? 
Constitutional questions come in all sizes and dimensions.  Generally, 
the President should have greater leeway to make an independent 
constitutional judgment to refuse to defend a law when his objection to the 
statute involves constitutional issues that raise significant normative and 
policy questions.  In contrast, if his constitutional objection is based on a 
relatively narrow point of law that does not implicate significant normative 
and policy considerations, or that calls for a fact-specific constitutional 
analysis, the Executive Branch should usually defend the law despite the 
President‘s constitutional views. 
This distinction is relevant because the narrower and more technical 
the constitutional issues, the less necessary it is for the President to take the 
 
16
  Presidential Authority to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, supra note 4 (―As a 
general matter, if the President believes that the Court would sustain a particular provision as 
constitutional, the President should execute the statute, notwithstanding his own beliefs about the 
constitutional issue.‖). 
17
  Waxman, supra note 1, at 1085–86 (―[U]nder Marbury v. Madison, the Supreme Court has the 
final word on the meaning of the Constitution.  The Solicitor General has an obligation to honor the 
important doctrine of stare decisis and a duty to respect the rulings of the Court.‖ (footnotes omitted)).  
Admittedly, there are those who call for a considerably more robust understanding of executive power in 
this area by contending that the President is free to disregard judicial interpretations of the Constitution 
with which he disagrees. Professor Michael Stokes Paulsen, for example, believes that: 
 
The Supreme Court‘s interpretations of treaties, federal statutes, or the 
Constitution do not bind the President any more than the President‘s or 
Congress‘s interpretations bind the courts.  Rather, the President possesses the 
power of full ‗legal review‘ of the actions of the other branches . . . in any matter 
that falls within the sphere of his governing powers as President. 
 
Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 
83 GEO. L.J. 217, 221 (1994). 
18
  It will not always be clear, of course, whether the relevant court precedents are sufficiently on 
point to be binding.  The President and his legal advisers will therefore have to make judgments on the 
applicability of prior judicial rulings.  Those judgments should be made while operating under the 
presumption that the Executive Branch should defend the law.  See supra notes 12–13 and 
accompanying text. 
19
  See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
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extraordinary step of refusing to defend a statute.  On the other hand, if the 
particular constitutional questions implicate ―big picture‖ issues that go to 
fundamental disagreements about our national values and who we are as a 
people, that should give the President greater leeway to exercise his 
independent authority to interpret the Constitution.20 
I will offer a few examples to explain what I mean by this factor.  
Consider the question of whether corporations have First Amendment rights 
that limit Congress‘s authority to restrict their ability to advocate for the 
election or defeat of particular candidates.  This issue raises significant 
normative and policy questions about the role of corporations in our society 
and how our electoral rules can best promote a robust exchange of ideas and 
perspectives.21  Accordingly, this is the kind of significant constitutional 
question22 that has sufficient normative and policy implications to warrant 
giving the President greater leeway in deciding whether to rely on his 
constitutional views to refuse to defend a law. 
There are other constitutional issues that do not raise the same kind of 
normative and policy questions, calling instead for a narrower and fact-
specific analysis.  For example, consider the question of what type of 
conduct is sufficiently expressive to be protected by the First Amendment.  
This issue does not seem to carry the same degree of significant policy 
implications as the question of whether corporations have First Amendment 
rights that are comparable to those of individuals.23  The former 
constitutional issue also seems to call for a more fact-specific analysis that 
seeks to determine what kind of conduct is sufficiently expressive to be 
constitutionally protected.24  The scope of corporations‘ First Amendment 
rights, on the other hand, is a considerably less factual and more normative 
question. 
One may object that considerations of judicial primacy in 
constitutional interpretation counsel in favor of granting the President less 
rather than more discretion to defend a statute when it implicates significant 
normative and policy considerations.  It might seem, in other words, that the 
interference with judicial primacy in constitutional interpretation is greater 
 
20
  On the President‘s authority, see supra note 4 and accompanying text.  See also Johnsen, supra 
note 2, at 27 (―As the head of a coordinate branch of the government, the President, no less than the 
courts, possesses the implicit constitutional authority and responsibility to interpret the Constitution in 
carrying out his assigned functions.‖). 
21
  See generally Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (link). 
22
  The Supreme Court, of course, has already decided this issue.  See id.  This means that there is a 
binding legal precedent that limits the President‘s authority to refuse to defend a law based on his 
different understanding of the First Amendment rights of corporations.  See supra note 16 and 
accompanying text. 
23
  Compare Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 899–907 (considering whether corporate entities have 
First Amendment rights), with United States v. O‘Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1968) (considering 
when conduct constitutes ―speech‖ for purposes of the First Amendment) (link). 
24
  See O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376–77. 
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when constitutional questions are ―bigger‖ than when they are ―smaller.‖  
But nothing that I say in this Essay is meant to question the Judiciary‘s role 
as the final arbiter of a statute‘s constitutionality.  That is one of the reasons 
why I believe other factors, such as the absence of binding legal 
precedents,25 and the likelihood of judicial review following a President‘s 
decision not to defend a statute,26 must also be taken into account in 
assessing the appropriateness of that decision. 
So the question, in my view, is not one of judicial primacy in 
constitutional interpretation.  Instead, the issue is one of executive 
prudence—that is, of the President being circumspect in taking the 
extraordinary step of refusing to defend a law based on his constitutional 
views.  It seems to me that the narrower the constitutional issue, the 
stronger the argument in favor of not exercising executive authority out of 
deference to the other two branches of government.  In contrast, the broader 
(or more important or more significant) the constitutional issue, the more 
reasonable it is for the President, as the leader of a co-equal branch of 
government that has a shared responsibility to interpret the Constitution,27 to 
assert his constitutional views by refusing to defend the statute in question. 
Obviously, there is no clear line separating the two categories of cases.  
As is true of the application of the other factors I explore in this Essay, the 
President and his advisers would have to bring good judgment and common 
sense to bear in distinguishing between broad, normative constitutional 
questions and narrow, fact-specific ones. 
The actions of prior presidents may provide some guidance.  The fact 
that presidents have previously addressed the normative and policy 
implications of the issues raised by the statute at issue may suggest that the 
constitutional questions are sufficiently broad and important to justify the 
President‘s assertion of his constitutional views by taking the extraordinary 
step of refusing to defend a federal law.  In contrast, if the statute raises 
normative and policy issues which prior presidents have rarely addressed, 
that suggests that the constitutional questions are sufficiently narrow and 
fact-based so as to counsel against the President refusing to defend the law 
based on his understanding of the Constitution. 
C. Did Congress Consider the Constitutional Issues? 
The Supreme Court has recognized that when Congress enacts 
legislation, ―it has not just the right but the duty to make its own informed 
judgment on the meaning and force of the Constitution.‖28  When a 
President refuses to defend a statute based on an understanding of the 
 
25
  See supra notes 15–19 and accompanying text. 
26
  See infra notes 31–33 and accompanying text. 
27
  See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
28
  City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535 (1997) (link).  The Court added that ―[w]ere it 
otherwise, we would not afford Congress the presumption of validity its enactments now enjoy.‖  Id. 
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Constitution that Congress has considered and rejected, there is a greater 
danger that he impermissibly tramples on the Legislative Branch‘s authority 
under Article I of the Constitution.29  At the same time, when Congress fails 
to address the relevant constitutional issues during the enactment process, 
that omission warrants giving the President more leeway to rely on his 
constitutional views to refuse to defend the statute. 
The extent to which Congress accounts for constitutional issues likely 
varies by legislation.  Returning to earlier examples, Congress may be more 
likely to pay attention to First Amendment issues when it considers election 
reform bills than when it restricts conduct that some may consider 
expressive (and therefore constitutionally protected).  A review of 
committee reports and floor debates may provide helpful guidance in 
determining whether congressional consideration of the relevant 
constitutional issues (or its absence) counsels in favor or against a 
President‘s decision to refuse to defend the law in question.30 
D. Is Judicial Review Nonetheless Likely? 
As I have already suggested, a President‘s decision not to defend a law 
should be viewed from the perspective of judicial primacy in matters of 
constitutional interpretation.31  It is therefore important for the President to 
consider whether a decision not to defend a statute makes it unlikely that 
the courts will have an opportunity to serve as the final arbiters of its 
constitutionality. 
When a President decides not to enforce a law, he may render it non-
justiciable because no individual may have standing to challenge a law that 
the government is not enforcing.32  A President‘s refusal to defend a law 
raises a different but related concern, that is, not whether there will be a 
party able to challenge the law, but instead whether there will be a party 
willing and able to defend it. 
It would seem that Congress should be entitled to defend the 
constitutionality of one of its laws if the Executive Branch refuses to do 
so.33  So the issue in these cases is not primarily one of standing.  Instead, 
the issue is one of willingness to defend.  It may be, for example, that a later 
 
29
  See Johnsen, supra note 2, at 34–35 (arguing that ―preservation of the lawmaking process as 
prescribed by Article I . . . precludes routine presidential non-enforcement‖ of federal statutes). 
30
  Id. at 35 (―[E]vidence often will exist as to whether Congress or some of its members held a 
competing constitutional view, or even identified and considered the constitutional issue, and the 
President should view such evidence as relevant to his enforcement decision.‖). 
31
  See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
32
  Johnsen, supra note 2, at 35 (―[I]f a President were to disregard a law he viewed as violative of 
individual rights, he might avoid any legally cognizable injury and thus eliminate the possibility that 
anyone with standing could litigate the constitutionality of the law.‖). 
33
  See generally Note, Executive Discretion and the Congressional Defense of Statutes, 92 YALE 
L.J. 970 (1983). 
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Congress will be unwilling to defend a law enacted by an earlier Congress 
(perhaps because control of the body shifted from one political party to the 
other).  If no other litigant with the requisite standing seems willing to 
defend the law, then that might preclude judicial review.  This possibility 
counsels against a presidential decision not to defend the statute in question. 
On the other hand, Congress (or some other party with the requisite 
standing) may be willing to take over the responsibility of defending the 
statute in court from the administration.  If this is likely to occur, the 
President should have greater leeway to refuse to defend the law at issue 
based on his constitutional views. 
II. PRESIDENT OBAMA‘S DOMA DECISION IN CONTEXT 
I proceed in this Section to apply the four factors explored above to 
President Obama‘s decision not to defend DOMA in the courts.  As I 
explain, all four factors support the view that President Obama acted 
appropriately when he declined to further defend the statute‘s 
constitutionality. 
A. Are There Binding Legal Precedents? 
The Obama Administration‘s decision not to defend DOMA‘s 
constitutionality came in response to two lawsuits challenging the statute 
filed in district courts in the Second Circuit.34  The venue is important 
because plaintiffs in DOMA cases contend that sexual orientation 
classifications merit heightened scrutiny,35 an issue that the Second Circuit 
has never addressed.36  As a result, the Department of Justice in the two 
Second Circuit cases was directly confronted with the question of what 
degree of deference courts owe to legislative enactments that classify 
individuals on the basis of sexual orientation in a jurisdiction whose courts 
have never considered the issue.37 
Some critics of the Administration‘s decision have claimed that it is 
settled law that only rational basis review applies to sexual orientation 
 
34
  Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Pedersen v. Office of Personnel Management, 
No. 310 CV 1750 VLB (D. Conn. Nov. 9, 2010), 2010 WL 4483820; Complaint, Windsor v. United 
States, No. 10 CV 8435 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2010), 2010 WL 5647015. 
35
  See, e.g., Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants‘ Motion to Dismiss and in Support 
of Plaintiffs‘ Motion for Summary Judgment at 22–26, Gill v. Off. of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374 
(D. Mass. 2010) (No. 1:09-cv-10309 JLT), 2009 WL 5803679 (link). 
36
  As I explain below, the Supreme Court has also never addressed the question of what level of 
review is appropriate for sexual orientation classifications.  See infra notes 40–42 and accompanying 
text. 
37
  Letter to Speaker, supra note 9, at 2 (―These new lawsuits . . . will require the Department [of 
Justice] to take an affirmative position on the level of scrutiny that should be applied to DOMA 
Section 3 in a circuit without binding precedent on the issue.‖). 
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classifications.38  According to these critics, the Department of Justice can 
defend DOMA simply by offering courts a rational justification for its 
enactment.  But the crucial threshold question that the Administration faced 
in the Second Circuit litigation was not whether there was a rational reason 
to support DOMA; instead, it was whether a rational reason was sufficient 
to defend the statute‘s constitutionality.39  And, despite the contention of 
some of the Administration‘s critics, the level of judicial review that should 
be applied in lawsuits alleging unconstitutional discrimination on the basis 
of sexual orientation is not well-settled. 
There are two main reasons for the uncertainty regarding the proper 
level of judicial scrutiny in cases alleging unconstitutional discrimination 
on the basis of sexual orientation.  First, the Supreme Court has never 
addressed the question.  Although lower courts sometimes claim that Romer 
v. Evans40 decided this issue,41 the Court in fact never reached that question.  
In Romer, the Court decided only that the Colorado constitutional provision 
at issue could not survive even the lowest level of scrutiny.42 
Second, even though some federal circuits (although notably not the 
Second Circuit) held in the 1980s and 1990s that sexual orientation 
classifications did not warrant heightened scrutiny, those courts did so 
largely on the ground that if the government could criminalize consensual 
same-sex activity—as the Court held it could in Bowers v. Hardwick43—
then sexual orientation should not be awarded heightened scrutiny.  For 
example, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, the first federal 
appellate court to address the issue of heightened scrutiny in sexual 
orientation cases following Hardwick, reasoned that: 
 
If the [Hardwick] Court was unwilling to object to state 
laws that criminalize the behavior that defines the class, it 
 
38
  See, e.g., Whelan, supra note 12, at 9; Ben Philpott, Texas AG Responds to President’s DOMA 
Decision, KUT NEWS, Feb. 25, 2011, http://kutnews.org/post/texas-ag-responds-presidents-doma-
decision (link). 
39
  See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
40
  517 U.S. 620 (1996) (link). 
41
  See, e.g., Schroeder v. Hamilton Sch. Dist., 282 F.3d 946, 950–51 (7th Cir. 2002) (link); Equal. 
Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289, 294 (6th Cir. 1997) (link). 
42
  See Arthur S. Leonard, Exorcising the Ghosts of Bowers v. Hardwick: Uprooting Invalid 
Precedents, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 519, 534–35 (2009) (―[The Romer Court] did not discuss whether 
sexual orientation should be considered a ‗suspect classification‘ or whether gay people should be 
considered a ‗suspect class,‘ or whether it was appropriate to subject Amendment 2 to ‗strict scrutiny‘ or 
‗heightened scrutiny‘ . . . .‖).  It bears noting that the Court in Romer did not engage in the traditional 
analysis of whether the classification in question should be subject to heightened scrutiny.  Specifically, 
the Court did not inquire whether there had been a long history of discrimination against lesbians and 
gay men or whether the sexual orientation of individuals affects their ability to perform in and contribute 
to society.  See infra notes 52–53 and accompanying text (discussing the criteria consistently used by the 
Court to determine whether heightened scrutiny should be applied). 
43
  478 U.S. 186 (1986) (link). 
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is hardly open to a lower court to conclude that state 
sponsored discrimination against the class is invidious.  
After all, there can hardly be more palpable discrimination 
against a class than making the conduct that defines the 
class criminal.44 
 
In the years that followed, several other federal circuits adopted this 
reasoning.45 
Even when Hardwick remained good law, it was possible to question 
the view that the absence of a due process right should definitively preclude 
heightened scrutiny for sexual orientation classifications under the Equal 
Protection Clause.46  Relying on Hardwick to categorically preclude 
heightened scrutiny, however, clearly became unsustainable after the 
Supreme Court resoundingly overruled it in Lawrence v. Texas.47  The 
Lawrence Court recognized that gay people, like straight ones, have a 
constitutionally protected right to make decisions about consensual sexual 
intimacy and partners without state interference.48  The Court also explicitly 
recognized the link between due process rights and equal protection ones.  
As the Court put it: ―Equality of treatment and the due process right to 
demand respect for conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of 
liberty are linked in important respects, and a decision on the latter point 
advances both interests.‖49  In emphasizing this connection, the Court 
pointed to the ways in which sodomy laws, like the one at issue in 
Lawrence, had been used to discriminate against lesbians and gay men in 
both the private and public spheres.50 
Now that the Supreme Court has made it clear that the state cannot 
criminalize consensual and private same-sex sexual conduct, it is necessary 
to look anew at the question of what level of judicial scrutiny is required of 
sexual orientation classifications under equal protection principles.  Yet, 
surprisingly, some federal appellate courts have continued to improperly 
rely on the pre-Lawrence cases to conclude, in cursory fashion, that 
 
44
  Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (link). 
45
  See Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 928 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (link); Richenberg v. Perry, 
97 F.3d 256, 260 (8th Cir. 1996) (link); Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 
54 F.3d 261, 267–68 (6th Cir. 1995), vacated, 518 U.S. 1001 (1996) (link); High Tech Gays v. Def. 
Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 571 (9th Cir. 1990) (link); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 
454, 464 (7th Cir. 1989) (link); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (link). 
46
  See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship 
Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161, 1164–70 (1988) (arguing that 
Hardwick did not preclude successful equal protection challenges to laws that discriminate on the basis 
of sexual orientation) (link). 
47
  539 U.S. 558 (2003) (link). 
48
  Id. at 574. 
49
  Id. at 575. 
50
  Id. 
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heightened scrutiny is not appropriate.51  In fact, I have been unable to find 
any post-Lawrence opinion issued by a federal appellate court that has 
bothered to apply the factors that the Supreme Court has consistently 
applied to determine whether classifications aimed at a particular group 
require heightened judicial scrutiny.  These factors are whether the group in 
question has suffered a long history of invidious discrimination52 and 
whether the trait at issue affects the ability of individuals to perform in or 
contribute to society.53  Recent federal appellate decisions that have 
addressed the heightened scrutiny issue in the context of sexual orientation 
have failed to ask either of those questions.54  Several state supreme courts, 
on the other hand, have recently held that sexual orientation classifications 
 
51
  See, e.g., Scarbrough v. Morgan Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 470 F.3d 250, 261 (6th Cir. 2006) (link); 
Lofton v. Sec‘y of the Dep‘t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 818 & n.16 (11th Cir. 2004) 
(link). 
52
  See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531–32 (1996) (link); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. 
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (link). 
53
  See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440–41 (1985) (link); 
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (plurality opinion) (link).  On some occasions, the 
Court has also discussed whether the characteristic in question is immutable and whether the group in 
question has the necessary political power to protect itself through the political process.  See, e.g., 
Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602 (1987) (link); Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986) (link).  
However, it is clear that neither of these factors is dispositive of the heightened scrutiny issue.  There are 
some traits that call for heightened scrutiny despite the fact that they are mutable.  See, e.g., Nyquist v. 
Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 9 n.11 (1977) (holding that alienage classifications are subject to heightened 
scrutiny despite the ability of some non-citizens  to naturalize) (link).  In addition, racial minorities and 
women have successfully attained increased political power over the last few decades, and yet both race 
and gender classifications are still subject to heightened scrutiny.  See Leonard, supra note 42, at 528–
29.  Furthermore, although it cannot be claimed that either whites or men lack political power, they are 
still afforded the protections of heightened scrutiny.  See Kerrigan v. Comm. of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 
407, 441 (Conn. 2008) (―[H]eightened scrutiny is applied to statutes that discriminate against men and 
against Caucasians.‖) (citation omitted) (link).  For an extended discussion of the limitations and 
inconsistencies that accompany the use of political power as a criterion in making the heightened 
scrutiny determination in the context of sexual orientation, see Jane S. Schacter, Ely at the Altar: 
Political Process Theory Through the Lens of the Marriage Debate, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1363, 1378–90 
(2011) (link). 
54
  The two post-Lawrence federal circuit court opinions involving sexual orientation classifications 
that provide a little more than a cursory discussion of the heightened scrutiny issue are Cook v. Gates, 
528 F.3d 42, 61 (1st Cir. 2008) (link), and Citizens for Equal Protection v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859, 865–
68 (8th Cir. 2006) (link).  Neither of these opinions, however, looked to the factors that the Supreme 
Court has consistently applied, see supra notes 52–53 and accompanying text, to determine whether 
heightened scrutiny was appropriate.  Instead, the Cook court refused to apply heightened scrutiny after 
concluding, without much analysis, that neither Lawrence nor Romer required it.  Cook, 528 F.3d at 61.  
As for the Bruning court, it also failed to apply the factors that the Supreme Court has consistently relied 
on and instead seems to have concluded that heightened scrutiny was not appropriate because the 
government, in a challenge to a constitutional provision approved by voters banning same-sex marriage, 
could rationally conclude that the inability of same-sex couples to reproduce accidentally justified their 
exclusion from marriage.  Bruning, 455 F.3d at 865–68.  This analysis is, to say the least, unsatisfactory 
because whether the government can rationally justify a particular provision does not address the 
antecedent question of whether the government should be required to provide more than a rational 
justification for the law at issue. 
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must survive heightened scrutiny.55  In interpreting their state constitutions, 
these courts have generally followed the analysis called for by the Supreme 
Court to determine what constitutes a suspect or quasi-suspect class under 
the federal Constitution.56 
It is by no means clear, therefore, that rational basis review is the 
proper form of scrutiny to apply to sexual orientation classifications.  This 
is especially true in a circuit, like the Second Circuit, that has not previously 
addressed the issue.  The absence of binding precedents weighs in favor of 
the appropriateness of the Obama Administration‘s decision to 
independently assess the question of whether sexual orientation 
classifications warrant the application of heightened scrutiny. 
B. What Is the Nature of the Constitutional Issues? 
As already noted, the Court, in determining whether a particular 
classification is generally valid or is instead constitutionally suspect,57 has 
consistently looked to whether the group in question has suffered a long 
history of invidious discrimination,58 and to whether the trait at issue affects 
the ability of individuals to perform in or contribute to society.59  It seems to 
me that these issues raise the kind of broad normative and policy questions 
that should give Presidents greater leeway in exercising their authority to 
make independent constitutional assessments.60  What constitutes 
impermissible discrimination, and which traits are relevant in assessing 
individuals‘ performance in and contributions to society, raise fundamental 
questions about who we are as a people and what our values are as a 
country.  These are not the kinds of narrow and somewhat technical 
constitutional questions that should limit the discretion of a President to 
refuse to defend a particular statute.61 
 
55
  See, e.g., Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 432; Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 896 (Iowa 2009) (link).  
But see Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 608 (Md. 2007) (―[S]exual orientation has not come of age as 
a suspect or quasi-suspect classification.‖) (link); Andersen v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963, 974–75 (Wash. 
2006) (―[G]ay and lesbian persons do not constitute a suspect class.‖) (link). 
56
  See, e.g., Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 426–28; Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 886–89. 
57
  ―The general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the 
classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.‖  Cleburne, 473 U.S. 
at 440 (citations omitted).  But when a legislative classification relies on race, alienage, or national 
origin, which are so-called suspect classifications, the Court applies strict scrutiny, requiring that it be 
―suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest.‖  Id. (citations omitted).  And when a 
classification is based on gender or illegitimacy, which are so-called quasi-suspect classifications, the 
Court has called for an intermediate form of scrutiny—one that requires a substantial connection to an 
important governmental interest.  Id. at 440–41. 
58
  See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
59
  See supra note 53 and accompanying text.  In supra note 52 I also briefly discuss immutability 
and political power as possible criteria in determining whether heightened scrutiny is appropriate. 
60
  See supra notes 20–26 and accompanying text. 
61
  See supra notes 20–26 and accompanying text. 
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The normative and policy importance of the constitutional issues at 
play in determining whether to apply heightened scrutiny in equal 
protection cases is reflected in the fact that prior Presidents have frequently 
taken specific stands on them.  Recent Republican presidents, for example, 
have defended a color-blind understanding of the Constitution, one that is 
skeptical of affirmative action and other efforts to remedy past 
discrimination by taking race into account in the distribution of jobs, 
educational opportunities, and other government benefits.62 
Indeed, the Obama Administration is not the first to conclude that a 
particular federal law is unconstitutional based on its independent judgment 
regarding the type of judicial scrutiny that is appropriate under equal 
protection principles.  In a 1990 case called Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. 
FCC,63 then Acting Solicitor General (and now Chief Justice) John 
Roberts,64 representing the George H. W. Bush Administration, filed an 
amicus brief urging the Court to apply heightened scrutiny to strike down a 
government policy—approved by Congress65—that accounted for racial 
minority ownership as one factor in awarding broadcast licenses.66  As with 
the Obama Administration and DOMA, the Bush Administration in Metro 
Broadcasting was confronted with the normatively crucial question of when 
to presume that the government acts improperly when it treats individuals 
differently because of their traits.67 
 
62
  See Stephen Plass, Exploring the Limits of Executive Civil Rights Policymaking, 61 OKLA. L. 
REV. 155, 174–80 (2008) (link). 
63
  497 U.S. 547 (1990) (link), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) 
(link). 
64
  John Roberts served as the acting Solicitor General in the Metro Broadcasting litigation because 
Solicitor General Kenneth Starr had a conflict of interest and recused himself from the case.  See Marty 
Lederman, John Roberts and the SG’s Refusal to Defend Federal Statutes in Metro Broadcasting v. 
FCC, BALKINIZATION, Sept. 8, 2005, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2005/09/john-roberts-and-sgs-refusal-
to-defend.html (link). 
65
  In 1978, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) adopted a policy that ―consider[ed] 
minority ownership as one factor‖ in awarding new broadcast licenses.  Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 
556.  At the time, ―minorities owned less than 1 percent of the Nation‘s radio and television stations.‖  
Id. at 553.  During the 1980s, Congress on several occasions enacted legislation approving the use of 
preferences for minority owners in awarding broadcast licenses.  For a review of Congress‘s role in 
mandating policies aimed at helping underrepresented groups get federal contracts and licenses in the 
years leading up to the Metro Broadcasting litigation, see id. at 572–79. 
66
  Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 8–17, Metro Broadcasting, 
497 U.S. 547 (No. 89–453), 1989 WL 1126975, at *8–17 (link).  Although the Office of the Solicitor 
General urged the Court to strike down the FCC policy, it permitted that agency to defend its policy in 
the courts.  Id. at *1 n.2. 
67
  It would seem that there was less uncertainty regarding the appropriate level of judicial review in 
affirmative action cases at the time of Metro Broadcasting than there was when the Obama 
Administration decided to cease defending DOMA‘s constitutionality.  Unlike the latter question, which 
the Supreme Court has never addressed, see supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text, the Court prior 
to Metro Broadcasting grappled with the issue of whether government-sponsored affirmative-action 
programs should be subject to strict scrutiny.  In 1980, it answered that question in the negative.  
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The Bush Administration‘s brief in Metro Broadcasting took the 
position that strict scrutiny should apply whenever the government uses 
race to allocate rights and benefits.68  It urged the Justices to deploy the 
most rigorous form of judicial scrutiny possible—one that requires the 
governmental action in question to be narrowly tailored to achieve a 
compelling state interest—in order to strike down the FCC policy aimed at 
increasing minority representation among the country‘s television and radio 
station owners.69 
There are many, of course, who take issue with this color-blind 
understanding of the Constitution, in the same way that some take issue 
with the question of whether lesbians and gay men are entitled to 
heightened scrutiny under equal protection principles.  These are questions, 
in other words, that reasonable people may disagree on.  But it would seem 
difficult to disagree that what constitutes impermissible discrimination in 
matters such as race and sexuality raises broad and important questions 
rather than narrow and fact-specific ones.  This factor weighs in favor of 
permitting a President to rely on his constitutional views on these matters to 
make the decision not to defend a statute that makes distinctions based on 
those traits. 
C. Did Congress Consider the Constitutional Issues? 
The impetus behind DOMA‘s enactment was the Hawaii Supreme 
Court‘s ruling in Baehr v. Lewin.70  The court in that case held that the 
state‘s ban on same-sex marriage was a sex classification that required the 
government, under the state constitution, to show the existence of a 
compelling interest.71  When Congress was considering DOMA, the 
statute‘s congressional supporters argued that the prospect of having same-
 
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), overruled by Adarand, 515 U.S. at 235 (1995) (link).  Even 
though there was not a majority opinion in Fullilove, six justices rejected the application of strict 
scrutiny in a challenge to a federal program that took race into account in awarding construction 
contracts.  Instead, three justices inquired ―whether the limited use of racial and ethnic criteria . . . is a 
constitutionally permissible means for achieving the congressional objectives[,]‖ id. at 473 (plurality 
opinion), while three others would have upheld affirmative action programs mandated by Congress that 
―serve important governmental objectives and are substantially related to achievement of those 
objectives.‖  Id. at 519 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
68
  Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 66, at 8–17. 
69
  Id.  The Court in Metro Broadcasting eventually upheld the FCC policy at issue, rejecting the 
Administration‘s position that congressionally-mandated racial classifications aimed at addressing 
discrimination should be subject to strict scrutiny.  Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 564–65.  Five years 
later, however, the Court overruled Metro Broadcasting by holding that strict scrutiny applies to all 
racial classifications regardless of whether they are adopted at the federal, state, or local level.  Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). 
70
  852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (link). 
71
  Id. at 64–67.  For an exploration of the background and impact of Baehr, see CARLOS A. BALL, 
FROM THE CLOSET TO THE COURTROOM: FIVE LGBT RIGHTS LAWSUITS THAT HAVE CHANGED OUR 
NATION 151–98 (2010). 
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sex marriages recognized in Hawaii raised ―the complicated issue of 
whether [other states] are . . . obligated under the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause to give binding legal effect to such unions.‖72  This made it 
necessary, in their view, to enact a federal statute addressing the issue.73  To 
bolster their position, DOMA supporters emphasized that Article IV of the 
Constitution authorizes Congress to give ―effect‖ to full faith and credit 
principles.74 
In contrast, congressional opponents of DOMA contended that 
Congress could not, through a statute, interfere with the constitutional 
authority of states to recognize marriages sanctioned in other states.75  
Opponents also noted that it was settled law that states could refuse to 
recognize marriages entered into in other states if those marriages violated 
their public policies.76 
A review of DOMA‘s legislative history leaves little doubt that 
Congress gave extensive consideration to the constitutional issues 
surrounding the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the recognition of same-
sex marriages.77  Since Congress considered the full faith and credit issues 
at great length when enacting DOMA, that would have counseled against 
President Obama relying on his constitutional views on those issues to 
refuse to defend the statute.78 
But President Obama‘s refusal to defend DOMA was not based on his 
understanding of the Full Faith and Credit Clause.  Instead, his objections 
were based entirely on equal protection grounds.79  And Congress, while 
considering DOMA, paid almost no attention to equal protection issues.80  
 
72
  H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 2 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2906. 
73
  See, e.g., id. (―H.R. 3396 anticipates these complicated questions by laying down clear rules to 
guide their resolution, and it does so in a manner that preserves each State‘s ability to decide the 
underlying policy issue however it chooses.‖). 
74
  See, e.g., id. at 26 (―[T]his much is clear: The Effects Clause is an express grant of authority to 
Congress to enact legislation to ‗prescribe‘ the ‗effect‘ that ‗public acts, records, and proceedings‘ from 
one State shall have in sister States.‖ (quoting U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (link))). 
75
  See, e.g., id. at 37 (―[W]hatever powers states have to reject a decision by another state to legalize 
same sex marriage, and to refuse to recognize such marriages within its own borders, derives directly 
from the Constitution and nothing Congress can do by statute either adds to or detracts from that 
power.‖). 
76
  See, e.g., id. at 38 (―Those states which desire to avoid the general rule favoring application of the 
law where the marriage was celebrated will rely on an enumerated public policy exception to the 
rule . . . .‖). 
77
  See supra notes 72–76 and accompanying text. 
78
  The full faith and credit issues are relevant in assessing the constitutionality of § 2 of DOMA.  
See Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. 104–199, § 2, 110 Stat. 2419, 2419 (1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1738C (2010)) (link).  President Obama‘s decision not to defend was limited to § 3 of the statute.  
Letter to Speaker, supra note 9, at 1. 
79
  See Letter to Speaker, supra note 9. 
80
  The only reference to the equal protection rights of lesbians and gay men that I have been able to 
find in DOMA‘s legislative history is a brief discussion in the House Committee Report on the 
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This was the case even though the statute (1) targets gay people and no 
others81 and (2) requires the federal government to treat some couples (i.e., 
same-sex ones) who are married under their states‘ laws differently from 
other married couples.82 
Indeed, DOMA‘s legislative history strongly suggests that many 
members of Congress were especially blind to their role in violating the 
equal protection rights of lesbians and gay men.  That history is laced with 
disparaging remarks about gay people and the extent to which their 
aspirations to have their relationships recognized as marital constituted a 
threat to the institution of marriage,83 to American families,84 and even to 
the ―moral and spiritual survival of this Nation.‖85  As a federal court noted 
recently in striking down the statute on equal protection grounds: 
 
In the floor debate, members of Congress repeatedly voiced 
their disapproval of homosexuality, calling it ―immoral,‖ 
―depraved,‖ ―unnatural,‖ ―based on perversion‖ and ―an 
attack upon God‘s principles.‖  They argued that marriage 
by gays and lesbians would ―demean‖ and ―trivialize‖ 
heterosexual marriage and might indeed be ―the final blow 
to the American family.‖86 
 
It is clear that Congress failed to consider the equal protection issues 
raised by its actions and statements in enacting DOMA.  As the head of a 
co-equal branch of government who takes an oath to uphold the 
 
applicability to DOMA of the Supreme Court‘s ruling, issued a few weeks before, in Romer v. Evans, 
517 U.S. 620 (1996) (link).  H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 31–33 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2905, 2935–37. 
81
  It could be argued that DOMA does not classify individuals on the basis of sexual orientation 
because the statute, on its face, is sexual orientation neutral.  This argument, however, need not detain us 
long because the clear purpose of the statute is to withhold recognition of lesbian and gay marriages.  
See infra notes 83–86 and accompanying text.  Indeed, to my knowledge, no court has ever held that 
DOMA (or a state ban against same-sex marriage) fails to classify individuals on the basis of sexual 
orientation. 
82
  See Defense of Marriage Act § 3 (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2010)) (link). 
83
  See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. H7275 (daily ed. July 11, 1996) (statement of Rep. Barr) (referring to 
marriage as ―an institution basic to not only this country‘s foundation and to its survival but to every 
Western civilization, [one that is] under direct assault by homosexual extremists all across the country, 
not just in Hawaii.‖) (link). 
84
  See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. H7276 (daily ed. July 11, 1996) (statement of Rep. Largent) 
(―Destroying the exclusive territory of marriage to achieve a political end will not provide homosexuals 
with the real benefits of marriage, but it may eventually be the final blow to the American family.‖) 
(link). 
85
  142 CONG. REC. S10,068 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1996) (statement of Sen. Helms) (link); see also 142 
CONG. REC. H7495 (daily ed. July 12, 1996) (statement of Rep. Lipinski) (―Allowing for gay marriages 
would be the final straw, it would devalue the love between a man and a woman and weaken us as a 
Nation.‖) (link). 
86
  Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 378–79 (D. Mass. 2010) (footnotes omitted). 
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Constitution, the President should be permitted to take into account 
Congress‘s failure to consider the equality implications of its enactments 
when determining how the nation‘s laws can best provide equal protection 
to a minority group of Americans. 
D. Is Judicial Review Nonetheless Likely? 
President Obama‘s decision not to defend DOMA did not mean that 
the statute would go undefended.  At the time the President made his 
decision, it was quite likely that the U.S. House of Representatives, under 
the firm control of conservative Republicans, would step forward to defend 
DOMA.  Indeed, a few days after the President‘s decision, the House 
Republican leadership announced it would defend the statute in the courts.87  
And a few weeks after that, the leadership hired former Solicitor General 
Paul Clement to defend DOMA‘s constitutionality.88  In the months since, 
Mr. Clement has filed several motions vigorously defending the statute.89 
As a result, President Obama‘s decision will not deprive the courts of 
the opportunity to fully review DOMA‘s constitutionality.  And this is as it 
should be; at the end of the day, it should be the Judiciary that determines 
whether sexual orientation classifications warrant heightened scrutiny and 
whether DOMA passes constitutional muster. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the Executive Branch should defend laws from court 
challenges in most instances, I have identified in this Essay four factors that 
a President should consider in determining whether to take the 
extraordinary step of refusing to defend the constitutionality of a federal 
law.  If (1) there are no binding judicial precedents on the relevant 
constitutional issues; (2) those issues are sufficiently broad to raise 
fundamental normative and policy questions; (3) Congress failed to 
consider the relevant constitutional issues when it enacted the law; and (4) 
 
87
  Jennifer Steinhauer, House Republicans Move to Uphold Marriage Act, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/05/us/politics/05marriage.html (link). 
88
  Steven Osborne, House of Representatives Hires Paul Clement to Represent DOMA, CHRISTIAN 
L. J., Apr. 21, 2011, http://www.christianlawjournal.com/featured-articles/house-of-representatives-
hires-paul-clement-to-represent-doma (link).  John Boehner, the Speaker of the U.S. House of 
Representatives, created the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group, whose membership consists of three 
Republicans and two Democrats, to consider defending DOMA.  Steinhauer, supra note 87.  Only the 
Republican members voted to defend DOMA in court.  Chris Geidner, House Republicans Vote to 
Defend DOMA in Court on Party Line 3-2 Vote, METROWEEKLY, Mar. 9, 2011, 
http://www.metroweekly.com/poliglot/2011/03/house-republicans-vote-to-defe.html (link). 
89
  See, e.g., Intervenor–Defendant‘s Motion to Dismiss, Pedersen v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., No. 
3:10–cv–1750 (VLB) (D. Conn. Aug. 15, 2011) (link); Memorandum of Law of Intervenor–Defendant 
the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the United States House of Representatives in Support of Its 
Motion to Dismiss, Windsor v. United States, No. 1:10–CV–8435 (BSJ)(JCF) (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2011) 
(link). 
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it is unlikely that the President‘s decision will preclude judicial review, then 
he is on firm ground in refusing to defend the statute in question.  President 
Obama‘s decision not to defend DOMA‘s constitutionality was appropriate 
because it satisfied all of these criteria. 
